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Abstract
Potential games and decentralised partially ob-
servable MDPs (Dec–POMDPs) are two com-
monly used models of multi–agent interaction,
for static optimisation and sequential decision–
making settings, respectively. In this paper we
introduce filtered fictitious play for solving re-
peated potential games in which each player’s
observations of others’ actions are perturbed by
random noise, and use this algorithm to con-
struct an online learning method for solving
Dec–POMDPs. Specifically, we prove that noise
in observations prevents standard fictitious play
from converging to Nash equilibrium in potential
games, which also makes fictitious play imprac-
tical for solving Dec–POMDPs. To combat this,
we derive filtered fictitious play, and provide con-
ditions under which it converges to a Nash equi-
librium in potential games with noisy observa-
tions. We then use filtered fictitious play to con-
struct a solver for Dec–POMDPs, and demon-
strate our new algorithm’s performance in a box
pushing problem. Our results show that we con-
sistently outperform the state–of–the–art Dec–
POMDP solver by an average of 100% across the
range of noise in the observation function.
1 Introduction
Increasingly, complex real-world problems are being tack-
led by teams of autonomous agents. Now, in artificial in-
telligence, the problem of controlling these agents is often
framed as a problem of distributed optimisation (e.g. [11]),
and one general method of optimisation is for each agent
to iteratively choose a better reply to the actions of the oth-
ers, given its beliefs. This paper focuses on one particular
iterative algorithm, fictitious play [5], and its application to
controlling teams of agents in single state and sequential
decision–making problems. However, a common feature
of the domains that agent systems are deployed in is un-
certainty about the actions of other team members, and this
can prevent algorithms like fictitious play from converging.
The specific type of uncertainty we consider in this paper
is when agents cannot accurately infer (either via sensors
or communication) the actions that were just taken by the
others in the team. We call this scenario perturbed obser-
vations to reflect the fact that it is the players’ observa-
tions, not their actions, that are noisy. As such, it requires
the players to incorporate the possibility of incorrect ob-
servations into their learning procedures. We envisage this
model applying to situations in which the players have on–
board payoff evaluation, which means that the joint action
that was just played cannot be inferred from the payoff an
agent receives. This feature arises in many scenarios, such
as: (i) mobile multi–robotics where agents share position
information using noisy odemetry — coordination is dif-
ficult when robots cannot share accurate positioning infor-
mation, (ii) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) target tracking,
in which individual UAVs need to estimate what the others
are currently tracking — images of a target may be needed
from many positions but a UAV can only approximately
infer the viewing angle of others, and (iii) distributed sen-
sor optimisation problems, where there are often significant
costs on communication (e.g. due to power restrictions), so
sensors use noisy communication channels to coordinate.
Against this background, potential games [12] are an im-
portant class of games that can be used as a design template
for agent–based distributed optimisation problems. This
class contains as special cases several important models
of multi–agent interaction, including: team or common–
interest games [18], where players have the same utility
function, and; marginal contribution games [11], where the
players are each rewarded with their marginal contribution
to a global target function. In more detail, a potential game
can be constructed from a global target function by dis-
tributing the system’s control variables among a set of play-
ers (or agents), and aligning each player’s utility function
with the system–wide goals. That is, payoffs are derived so
that a player’s payoff for changing strategy increases if and
only if the global reward also increases (as in [20]). If the
players’ utilities are aligned with the global target function,
then the global target function is a potential function for the
game, and the game is a potential game. (The models above
are two examples of games in which players’ utilities are
aligned with the global target function.) Importantly, if the
agents’ utilities and the global reward are aligned, then the
pure Nash equilibria (NE) of the resulting game correspond
to the local optima of the global target function, and, fur-
thermore, these can be computed in a distributed fashion
using an iterative algorithm such as fictitious play. How-
ever, perturbations to the agents’ observations, which may
cause an agent to incorrectly record the actions of others,
may disrupt the convergence of such iterative algorithms.
Within this context, the first contribution of this paper is
to identify precisely the conditions under which noise in
action observations prevents fictitious play from converg-
ing in potential games.1 In more detail, we show that if
action observations are noisy, some (or all) strict NE are
removed from the set of possible stationary points of any
standard fictitious play process; in some cases, the global
optimum for a team problem may be removed from the set
of stationary points of fictitious play, which is clearly prob-
lematic. Our second contribution, then, is to derive a gen-
eralised version, called filtered fictitious play (FFP), which
addresses the above shortcoming. We derive a method for
integrating a noise filtering process with the belief revision
of fictitious play, and derive a specific version of FFP based
on a Bayesian filter. In potential games with perturbed ac-
tion observations, we prove that FFP converges to a pure
NE in many cases where standard fictitious play fails due
to the noise (but would have converged in its absence).
Building on these results, we then move on to consider par-
tially observable stochastic games [7]. Stochastic games
comprise several states or stage games, with agents’ actions
causing transitions between these states. Partially observ-
able stochastic games (POSGs) have the additional com-
plication that the agents may be uncertain of what the cur-
rent state actually is, and as such, POSGs capture multi–
agent sequential decision–making under uncertainty. With
this in mind, a stochastic game can also possess a poten-
tial function.2 One prominent example of this is called a
team Markov game [10], which has as a potential func-
tion the team objective function that is to be optimised
by the agents. As such, fictitious play could be used to
solve these games, and indeed, a version of a related algo-
rithm called adaptive play was used by [18] to solve team
Markov games. Fictitious play presents a useful direction
for solving POSGs, since other agents can be grouped to-
1Fictitious play also solves other classes of games, such as
two–player zero–sum games, but in this paper we focus on poten-
tial games because of their connection to optimisation problems.
2Potential games are typically characterised in terms of single
state games, but the definition is extended to stochastic games by
defining a potential over the joint policy space. If such a potential
can be constructed, then the stochastic game is a potential game.
gether and effectively regarded as a single entity which the
deliberating agent must respond to. This makes it naturally
distributed and of lower computational complexity com-
pared to distributed planning approaches. However, it is
not immediately clear how to extend fictitious play from
stochastic games to the more general class of POSGs, or
even the simplest subclass of POSGs that directly gener-
alise team Markov games, namely decentralised partially
observable MDPs (Dec–POMDPs). This is because stan-
dard fictitious play is not equipped to deal with uncertain
action observations. Specifically, action observation per-
turbations prevent fictitious play from correctly identifying
the state, which induces errors in policy valuations that are
propagated through the candidate solutions. The third con-
tribution of this paper, then, is to show how FFP can be
extended to solving POSGs in which uncertainty in the ac-
tions of the other agents makes it hard for the agent to track
which stage game (state) it is currently in. We use FFP as
a component in a new online reinforcement learning algo-
rithm based on local search. Experimental results in a clas-
sic cooperative box pushing Dec–POMDP with noisy ac-
tion observations show that it significantly outperforms the
state of the art when allowed to learn for the same length of
time as the state-of-the-art algorithm’s runtime.
Related work: Several researchers have investigated re-
inforcement learning techniques for computing NE in
stochastic games, and general–purpose algorithms such as
R–max, OAL and WoLF have been derived (for a review
and empirical comparison, see [2]). However, all these al-
gorithms rely on perfect observations of the actions of the
other agents. On the other hand, algorithms have also been
developed for POSGs (e.g. [1], or the current state of the
art, Point Based Policy Generation, PBPG [21]), but these
approaches are approximate and not proven to converge
to a NE. This is because, in general, solving POSGs of-
fline for a decentralised policy is a NEXP–complete prob-
lem [4]. Now, there are several possible ways to combat
this problem, such as finding a centralised policy offline
(PSPACE) and executing it online using a communication
protocol [14]. Unfortunately, deriving the communication
protocol generally is again a hard problem. In response,
approaches such as [16] use heuristic communication pro-
tocols during execution, however they have no performance
guarantees. Now, agents can also attempt to optimise a
POSG online using local techniques (e.g. [19]), which are
scalable as the entire problem is not solved, but these ap-
proaches also are not guaranteed to find a NE. Given this,
we aim to develop a scalable method for learning NE in par-
tially observable domains. Finally, we could have chosen to
ignore the other agents entirely by treating them as a noisy
part of the environment, and then apply standard reinforce-
ment learning techniques, as in [8]. In practice, however,
such approaches learn very slowly, because the rewards ob-
tained are extremely noisy — and possibly non–stationary,
due to changes in the underlying choice of actions induced
by noisy observations. In contrast, using fictitious play to
respond to the other agents’ actions removes the possibility
of such non–stationarity in rewards arising.
Paper structure: Section 2 introduces potential games,
and reviews the analytical tools used: p–dominance and
results for generalised weakened fictitious play (GWFP) (a
broad class of fictitious play processes). In Section 3 we
introduce games with perturbed observations, and explain
why GWFPs do not necessarily converge in these games.
This motivates Section 4, where we show how to integrate
a noise filtering process within the belief revision of GWFP,
derive a specific version of FFP based on a Bayesian filter,
and prove that FFP converges to pure NE in many games
with noisy action observations where GWFP does not. We
also numerically compare FFP with a standard GWFP to
demonstrate its benefits. In Section 5, we derive an algo-
rithm for solving POSGs, and demonstrate its performance
in a standard Dec–POMDP. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
This section first describes noncooperative games, poten-
tial games and the concept of p–dominant NE. We then in-
troduce GWFP processes and show how they are analysed
using stochastic approximations and differential inclusions.
2.1 Noncooperative Games and Potential Games
We consider repeated play of a finite noncooperative game,
Γ = 〈N,{Ai,ri}i∈N〉, consisting of a set of players N =
{1, . . . ,n}, and for each i ∈ N, a finite set of (pure) actions
Ai, with joint action space A =×Ni=1Ai, and a reward func-
tion ri : A → R. A player’s reward function specifies its
ranking over all joint action profiles, a ∈ A, also called out-
comes. Players can choose to play an action according to
a lottery, known as a mixed strategy. This is a probability
distribution over pure actions Ai, such that pii ∈ ∆i, the set
of distributions over Ai. The rewards of the mixed exten-
sion of the game are given by the expected value of ri under
all players’ joint independent lottery pi ∈ ×i∈N∆i over A:
ri(pi) = ∑
a∈A
(
∏
j∈N
pi j(a j)
)
ri(a). (1)
We use the notation a = (ai,a−i) where a−i is the joint ac-
tion chosen by all players other than i, and pi = (pii,pi−i)
where pi−i is the joint independent lottery similarly.
An agent’s goal is to maximise its reward, and a best re-
sponse correspondence, bi(pi−i), is the set of i’s best strate-
gies, given the strategies of the other players:
bi(pi−i) = {pii ∈ ∆i : ri(pii,pi−i) = max
pi′i∈∆i
ri(pi
′
i,pi−i)}
Stable points are characterised by the set of Nash equilib-
ria, which are defined as those joint strategy profiles, pi∗:
ri(pi
∗
i ,pi
∗
−i)− ri(pii,pi
∗
−i)≥ 0 ∀ pii, ∀ i. (2)
That is, in a NE, pi∗i ∈ bi(pi∗−i). Building on the NE condi-
tion, a strict NE is one in which the player is not indifferent
between the equilibrium action and any other action (i.e.
the inequality in (2) is instead strict), and so must be a pure
strategy equilibrium..
We can also weaken a best response, to define a δ–best re-
sponse and the associated δ–NE, which are useful concepts
in our analysis. First, a δ-best response correspondence,
bδi (pi−i) is the set of strategies that come within δ of max-
imising i’s reward, conditional on other players’ strategies:
bδi (pi−i) = {pii ∈ ∆i : ri(pii,pi−i)≥ max
pi′i∈∆i
ri(pi
′
i,pi−i)−δ}.
Then, a strategy profile pi∗ is an δ–NE if pi∗i ∈ bδi (pi∗−i) ∀i.
We now define a specific form of a δ–best response, in
which an agent plays (or its opponents observe) a best re-
sponse with probability 1− ε and a random non–best re-
sponse with probability ε. We call such a mixed strategy an
ε–best response, ˜bεi (pi−i), and it places the following proba-
bilities of selection (or observation) on each action ai ∈ Ai:
˜bεi,ai(pi−i) =
{
1−ε
|bi(pi−i)| if ai ∈ bi(pi−i),
ε
|Ai|−|bi(pi−i)| otherwise,
Note that an ε–best response returns an expected pay-
off that is within δ = ε(maxa∈A[ri(a)]−mina∈A[ri(a)]) of a
best response, and furthermore ε → 0 implies δ → 0. Also,
note that in the remainder of the paper, when we refer to a
specific value, e.g. a 0.8–best response, we will always be
referring to an ε–best response (δ–best responses are used
for analysis only).
The class of potential games is characterised as those
games that admit a function specifying the participants’
joint preference over outcomes [12], known as a potential
function. This is a function on the joint action space A such
that the difference in the potential induced by a unilateral
deviation of action equals the change in the deviator’s re-
ward, i.e. ∀ i ∈ N, ∀ ai, a′i ∈ Ai, and ∀a−i ∈ A−i:
P(ai,a−i)−P(a′i,a−i) = ri(ai,a−i)− ri(a
′
i,a−i)
Importantly, the local optima of the potential function are
NE of the game; that is, the potential is locally maximised
by self-interested agents in a system. In order to highlight
the connections to distributed optimisation, observe that if
the players’ rewards are aligned with the global target func-
tion (i.e. an increase in a player’s reward improves the sys-
tem reward), then the global target function is a potential
function for the game. This, in turn, implies that the (pure)
NE of the game correspond to the local optima of the target
function. This is a very useful property, because it implies
that the local optima of the target function are stable.
2.2 p–Dominant Equilibria
We make use of the concept of p–dominance [13] to ex-
plain the effect of perturbed action observations on GWFP
learning processes. The p–dominance criterion is a stabil-
ity concept. Specifically, a strict pure strategy NE is p–
dominant if each agent’s action is a best response to any
joint mixed strategy placing at least probability p on the
other agents playing their pure strategies in the equilibrium.
Formally, in a p–dominant NE, each agent’s action must be
a best response to any joint mixed profile placing least p on
the pure equilibrium profile. Define:
¯bp−i,a∗ = {pi−i ∈ ∆−i : (pi−i(a
∗
−i)≥ p)}
as the set of joint profiles of i’s opponents that place at least
probability p on a particular equilibrium profile a∗. Then,
a pure NE a∗ is called p–dominant if the following holds
for all p¯ip−i,a∗ ∈ ¯b
p
−i,a∗ :
ri(a
∗
i , p¯i
p
−i,a∗)− ri(pii, p¯i
p
−i,a∗)≥ 0 ∀pii ∈ ∆i, ∀i ∈ N. (3)
An intuitively appealing interpretation of p–dominance is
that it defines a spectrum of stability between strict NE at
p = 1 to dominant strategy equilibria at p = 0.
Alongside p–dominant equilibria, we will refer to the min-
imum p–dominant equilibrium in a game, which is the
NE with the lowest value of p for which (3) is satis-
fied. We also call NE p–dominated if there exists a
p¯ip−i,a∗ ∈
¯bp−i,a∗ such that the condition in (3) is violated. Fi-
nally, note that any element of the joint ε–best response,
˜bε−i(pi) =× j∈−i ˜bεj(pi− j), is a particular element of ¯b
p
−i,a∗
with p = (1− ε)N−1.
2.3 Generalised Weakened Fictitious Play
GWFP processes have been analysed using results from
stochastic approximations and differential inclusions. Sim-
ilarly, we make use of these tools to analyse GWFP pro-
cesses and FFP in the presence of observation noise. To
begin, we describe the classical fictitious play process. Let
agent i’s historical frequency of playing ai, be defined as:
σti,ai =
1
t
t−1
∑
τ=0
I{aτi = ai},
where I{a′i = aτi } is an indicator function equal to one if
a′i is the action played by i at time τ, and zero otherwise.
We write σt = {σti,ai}i∈N,ai∈Ai for the vector of these be-
liefs, and σt−i for the beliefs about all players other than
i. In classical fictitious play, the chosen action is a best–
response to the historical frequencies of all the other play-
ers; ati ∈ bi(σt−i). Writing b(σ) = ×i∈Nbi(σ−i) for the set
of joint best responses, the fictitious play recursion can be
restated as the recursive inclusion:
σt+1 ∈
(
1− 1
t + 1
)
σt +
1
t + 1
b(σt).
In [3], the convergence properties of this recursion are anal-
ysed using the theory of stochastic approximation of dif-
ferential inclusions. Building on this, the class of gener-
alised weakened fictitious play (GWFP) processes are char-
acterised in [9]. These are processes that admit a more gen-
eral belief–updating process and allow δ–best responses to
be played by the agents (i.e. weakened best responses). We
write bδ(σ) = ×i∈Nbδi (σ−i) for the set of joint δ-best re-
sponses. In a GWFP process, beliefs follow the inclusion:
σt+1 ∈ (1−αt+1)σt +αt+1(bδt (σt )+Mt+1) (4)
with αt → 0 as t → ∞, ∑t≥1 αt = ∞, and where {Mt}t≥ 1
is a sequence of martingale differences. For αt conditions
to hold, the sequence must approach 0 slower than 1/t, i.e.
where αt = (Cα + t)−ρα for constants Cα and ρα ∈ (0,1].3
It has been shown that as t → ∞, trajectories of (4) approx-
imate the differential inclusion:
d
dt σ
t ∈ bδ(σt)−σt . (5)
Furthermore, under the assumption that δ → 0, the station-
ary points of this differential inclusion are limit points of
the difference process, which correspond to a subset of NE
to which any GWFP process converges (as shown in [9]).
Hence the limit set of a GWFP process (4) is a connected
internally chain-recurrent set of the differential inclusion
(5), which in turn implies that the limit set of a GWFP pro-
cess consists of a connected set of NE in potential games,
two-player zero-sum games, and generic 2× n games.
3 Games with Perturbed Observations
In this section we introduce a model of perturbed observa-
tions in repeated games. Now, standard results on learning
in games assume that if players observe their opponents’
actions, they do so without noise. A more realistic scenario
is that action observations include some noise: this could
happen because, for example, noisy sensors are used to de-
tect the other agents’ actions, or agents report their actions
using a noisy communication medium. After defining the
setting, we investigate how relaxing the assumption of per-
fect observations affects fictitious play processes.
In more detail, although we could use any model of obser-
vation noise (e.g. Gaussian), we choose to use the following
model of noisy action observations:
Definition 1 A game with perturbed action observations
is a game in which, when the joint action a ∈ A is played,
each agent i ∈ N receives the observation of each a j in a−i
with probability 1− ε, and a different, randomly generated
action a˜ j 6= a j with probability ε.
Beyond this, we also assume that agents have some knowl-
edge of the process generating observation perturbations,
3It is useful to think of {Mt}t≥1 as a sequence of zero–mean
random perturbations, caused by responses to non–best response
profiles, whose effect eventually disappears.
which we feel is reasonable in our application domains. For
example, in settings where observation perturbations are
generated by noisy sensors, agents typically possess a prob-
abilistic model of their sensors. Similarly, agents employ-
ing noisy communication channels to coordinate usually
have some knowledge of the way that errors are generated
in their messages. Furthermore, these noise–generating
models do not need to be precise, because, as we show later,
our results apply even with adaptive noise modelling func-
tions as long as the errors in those functions are bounded.
We now show that perturbations to action observations
prevent standard GWFP processes from converging, us-
ing the concept of p–dominance and results from stochas-
tic approximations. In general, the non–convergence of all
GWFP processes in games with perturbed action observa-
tions can be explained by examining their effects on the
belief updates given in (4).
Theorem 1 Perturbations to action observations with
noise level ε will prevent a GWFP process from converg-
ing to a p–dominated NE for p < (1− ε)N−1 in any class
of games in which standard GWFP processes do converge
(as listed in Section 2.3).
Proof: Recall that for a GWFP process to converge,
bδ(σ)→ b(σ) as t → ∞. If this assumption is not satisfied,
the difference process defined by GWFP does not have any
limit points, and, furthermore, in general, its trajectory will
not be contained within a particular sub–region of the joint
strategy space. Given this, in the presence of noise in action
observations, beliefs follow an inclusion given by:
σt+1 ∈ (1−αt+1)σt +αt+1(˜bε(σt)+Mt+1), (6)
where ˜bε(σt) =×i∈N ˜bεi (a−i), which captures the effects of
action observation noise. Note that, unlike the noise–free
situations in which standard GWFP processes are assumed
to operate, perturbations to action observations do not dis-
appear. The persistence of this noise in the action observa-
tions implies that the trajectories of (6) are stochastic ap-
proximations of a new differential inclusion, given by:
d
dt σ
t ∈ ˜bε(σt)−σt . (7)
Stationary points of (7) exist only at (1− ε)N−1–dominant
equilibria, rather than at all NE. Furthermore, if a station-
ary point exists, the sequence of martingale differences,
{Mt}t≥ 1, also converge to zero as play converges to this
stationary point, because the frequency of non–best re-
sponse actions declines as play converges. Therefore, in
the presence of perturbed observations of actions, standard
GWFP processes converge only to p–dominant equilibria
for p = (1− ε)N−1. 
Corollary 1 Standard GWFP processes are not generally
guaranteed to converge in games with perturbed action ob-
servations.
Proof: This is a consequence of Theorem 1: If all of the
NE in the game are p–dominated for p = (1− ε)N−1, then
there must exist an action ai 6= a∗i for some player such that:
ri(a
∗
i ,σ
t
−i)− ri(ai,σ
t
−i)< 0.
because ˜bε−i,a∗ ≥ σti,a∗ . As a consequence, for high enough
levels of noise in action observations, the differential in-
clusion in (7) may not have any stationary points, the se-
quence {Mt}t≥ 1 does not disappear, and standard GWFP
processes are not guaranteed to converge. 
Here we note that, although conceivably arising in games
with perturbed action observations, no other forms of at-
tractors, such as correlated equilibria or chaotic attractors,
are either (i) analytically proven to be convergence points
for GWFP, or (ii) appropriate for the optimisation problem
we intend to apply the technique to, in which optimal con-
figurations of agents’ actions arise at NE of the game.
An example of a game in which a standard GWFP does not
converge in the presence of perturbed action observations
is given below for our UAV target tracking domain.
Example 1 Consider two UAVs employing GWFP to co-
ordinate on positions that maximise sensor coverage of a
target. The optimal configuration has one UAV above the
target and the other in a secondary point, giving rewards
of (1,0) or (0,1). If both find secondary points then they
get no reward (0,0), while if both attempt to get above the
target they collide, giving (−4,−4). This is shown below:
Player 2
Secondary Above
Player A Secondary 0,0 1,0
Above 0,1 -4, -4
This is a potential game, so in the absence of noise in action
observations, UAVs coordinating via GWFP will converge
to one of the NE, which are located at either of the off–
diagonal pure actions, and a symmetric mix with 0.8 prob-
ability of choosing the secondary position by both UAVs.
However, if the UAVs’ action observations are perturbed
with probability ε > 0.2 (because, e.g., they cannot accu-
rately detect each others’ movements), then a GWFP pro-
cess will not converge. To see this, note that the expected
rewards to the row UAV for either action are equal at the
mixed strategy equilibrium. As such, even if the column
UAV continually plays the secondary position, if ε > 0.2
then the row UAV will not take the above position, because
it observes the other UAV choosing the above position with
too great a probability. Noise in action observations di-
rectly prevents the UAVs’ from converging to the mixed NE.
In practice, GWFP processes do converge to a strict NE in
the presence of noise until ε > 1− p
1
N−1 for the minimum
p–dominant equilibrium in the game. Beyond this noise
level, the process never stays at a NE. We demonstrate this
type of threshold behaviour in Section 4.3.
4 Filtered Fictitious Play
In this section we introduce filtered fictitious play (FFP).
The section is divided into three parts. In the first, we de-
rive a general method for integrating a noise filter into the
GWFP belief revision process. This method allows us to
analyse the trajectories of any FFP process using the same
techniques as GWFP. As a concrete example of an FFP pro-
cess, we derive a specific version of FFP that makes use of
a Bayes filter on the noise in action observations, which is
appropriate to settings where the noise generating process
is known to the agents. In the second part of the section,
we assume that the agents have access to a noise filtering
process of bounded precision η, and present our main re-
sult: FFP will converge to any p–dominant NE for p up to
(1−η)N−1. A corollary is that when the noise generating
process is known to the agents, a Bayes filter gives accurate
estimates of the true frequency of actions played, therefore
FFP converges to any strict NE and will converge in any
game that GWFP processes converge to a strict NE (i.e. the
class of potential games). The final part of this section il-
lustrates the improved convergence properties of FFP with
a Bayes noise filter by comparing it to a naı¨ve, standard
GWFP process in the game from Example 1.
4.1 Filtered Belief Revision
FFP uses a filter to remove noise in action observations,
while operating within the general analytical framework
provided by GWFP. As such, we can prove its convergence
in many games with perturbed action observations. To un-
derstand why this is necessary, see that, from (6), in stan-
dard GWFP processes, a noisy observation alters an agent’s
belief in player i’s action ai in the following way:
σt+1i,ai = σ
t
i,ai +α
t+1(P(a˜ti |a
t
i)−σ
t
i,ai)
where P(a˜ti|ati) = ˜bεi,ai(σ−i). Specifically, GWFP naı¨vely
updates its belief in the observed action with the probability
that what is observed is the true action, P(a˜|ai), and the
same mutatis mutandis for unobserved actions.
This is incorrect. We need the probability that ai is played,
given the observation a˜i. In general, we can use a noise
correcting filter to generate this probability,4 i.e.:
P(ai|a˜i) = φ(a˜i,P(ai),θ),
where φ takes the observation, a set of filter coefficients θ
and (possibly) prior information P(ai) as parameters. By
setting the prior to the current belief, P(ai) = σi,ai , we then
intergrate the filter into the best response correspondence,
which results in the following belief update rule:
σt+1i,ai = σ
t
i,ai +α
t+1 (bi(φ(a˜ti ,σt−i,θ))−σti,ai) (8)
4We leave the investigation of the practicalities of this inter-
esting avenue of research for future work, and focus here on the
general derivation.
We assume that the filter in use is able to remove noise and
return an estimate of precision η. To define this formally,
the ‘true’ (i.e. unperturbed) belief in i′s actions is given by:
σ¯ti =
1
t
t−1
∑
τ=0
I{aτi = ai},
We say that the maximum precision of any belief revision
process is η if, given a fixed action profile a−i:
lim
t→∞
|σ¯ti(a−i)−P(at−i|a˜−i,σ
t−1
−i ,θ)|= η (9)
In the next section, we make use of this bound to charac-
terise the class of games in which FFP converges to a NE.
However, before moving on to our main results, we now
build on this general method to derive a belief revision rule
for situations where the noise generating process is known
(e.g. from a probabilistic sensor model or known properties
of the communication medium). In such circumstances, we
can use Bayes rule to compute P(ai|a˜i), that is:
P(ai|a˜i) =
P(a˜i|ai)P(ai)
∑
a′i∈Ai
P(a˜i|a′i)P(a
′
i)
Again, we set the prior to the current belief, P(ai) = σi,ai ,
but now make use of the the noise generating function,
˜bε(a−i), as defined in (1), to derive the following filtered
best response correspondence:
b(P(at−i|a˜t−i,σt−i,ε)) =
˜bεi,ai(σ
t
−i)σ
t
i,ai
∑
a′i∈Ai
˜bεi,a′i(σ
t
−i)σ
t
i,a′i
. (10)
The result is a Bayesian filtered belief revision rule:
σt+1i,ai = σ
t
i,ai +α
t+1 (b(P(at−i|a˜t−i,σt−i,ε))−σti,ai) (11)
Finally, note that the above belief revision specifications
are sufficient if the goal is to find a pure NE, but at this
stage it is unclear if it is sufficient for convergence to mixed
NE, although this is not likely to be the case.5
4.2 Convergence to Nash Equilibrium of FFP
We now prove that the FFP process defined in (8) converges
to strict NE in many games in which perturbations to action
observations prevent the convergence of standard GWFP
processes. The result depends on proving that as t → ∞,
the filtered belief update process comes closer to the ‘true’
belief corresponding to a p–dominated NE than a standard
GWFP process, and uses the definition of precision in (9).
5C.f., several authors have investigated using Dirichlet pro-
cesses to update distributions over mixed strategies in an attempt
to capture convergence to mixed NE in games with perfectly ob-
servable actions, but without success (see, e.g. [6, 15]).
Theorem 2 FFP with belief revision of maximum preci-
sion η can converge to a (1−η)N−1–dominant equilibrium.
Proof: This theorem follows from the same reasoning as
Theorem 1, where now the lower limit on p is related to
the precision of the belief revision process. As such, the
stationary points of the stochastic approximation:
d
dt σ
t ∈ b(P(at−i|a˜−iσt−i,ε))−σt (12)
only exist at (1− η)N−1–dominant equilibria, where η is
the precision of the estimator of P(at−i|a˜−iσt−i,ε). 
Thus, if the process generating perturbations is known, then
using the Bayesian filtered belief revision rule in (10), en-
sures that η < ε, giving us the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If the perturbation process is known, then
FFP using the Bayesian filtered belief revision will con-
verge to a strict NE in all games with action observa-
tion perturbations in which standard GWFP converges to
a strict NE in the absence of noise.
Most importantly for the application of FFP to distributed
optimisation problems, this includes potential games. In
practice, however, very high levels ofnoise will prevent any
FFP from converging.
On the speed of convergence of beliefs in FFP processes:
Although using filtered updates and λt = 1/t may cause be-
liefs to move more slowly than classical fictitious play in
games with low noise, this can be significantly boosted by
putting more weight on the newest filtered updates, by al-
tering the form of λt . Recall that one convergent form for
this sequence is λt =(Cλ+t)ρλ , with Cλ ≥ 0 and ρλ ∈ (0,1].
By setting ρλ closer to zero, more weight is given to the fil-
tered update of the belief. This improves the speed which
φ(·) filters noise. However, for the process to still converge,
the players’ beliefs must not be completely updated with
the filtered revision (i.e. ρλ cannot be set to 0).
4.3 Numerical Demonstration
We now demonstrate the non-convergence of GWFP pro-
cesses in the simple UAV monitoring game with perturbed
action observations, as described in Example 1, and also
show how FFP processes do converge in this same domain.
We do this to demonstrate both the brittleness of GWFP in
the presence of noise and robustness of FFP with that same
noise. This evaluation give a concrete demonstration of the
previous two theoretical results.
Results are shown in Fig 1, with error bars showing two
standard errors. GWFP initially converges to the NE nearly
all of the time (%N > 96), however, for ε ≥ 0.2, its perfor-
mance quickly drops to 0. This is because it cannot learn
an accurate mixed strategy for the other agent since it sees
very noisy observations and assumes that this represents
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Figure 1: Convergence in the UAV monitoring game.
the mixed strategy being played. In contrast, FFP is much
more resistant to noise and is unaffected until ε ≥ 0.4. At
this point, FFP also drops to 0 because there is very little
information in the observations, so effectively, the agents
cannot observe what the other is playing at all. In sum-
mary, FFP has a convergence rate of 82% whereas GWFP
has only 41% across the range of ε. These results show the
power of using Bayesian inference to account for observa-
tion noise — and consequently show that FP may still be
used in highly uncertain domains. Next, we show how FFP
is used in a learning algorithm for POSGs in which agents
are uncertain about the current stage game.
5 Sequential Decision–Making
Now that we have proved FFP’s convergence in single–
state games with perturbed action observations, we can
use FFP as a component of an algorithm for solving Dec–
POMDPs (i.e. team POSGs). We concentrate on the spe-
cific sub-class where agents know the utility and transition
functions in advance. The problem here is to learn a best
action in each state and furthermore, accurately track which
stage game is being played. In the first part of this section
we derive an algorithm using FFP for this problem, and
then in the second part we demonstrate its utility in a stan-
dard Dec–POMDP, namely, cooperative box pushing.
5.1 FFP–based Lookahead Search Algorithm: LFFP
Our algorithm, LFFP, is designed for POSGs in which
agents jointly optimise a potential function, and in which
the agents’ actions are the only cause of transitions between
stage games. In the case of a team game, where the agents
directly optimise a potential function given by the global
target function, this class of POSGs corresponds to a sub–
class of Dec–POMDPs with action dependent state tran-
sitions. In these games, tracking the current state is very
important because the current stage game influences the re-
wards for different actions, and, furthermore, agents must
be able to predict state transitions in order to plan into the
future to achieve the optimal reward.
Formally, a POSG comprises a finite set of stage games,
S = {Γ1, . . . ,Γ|S|}, where each stage game is a noncoop-
erative game as described in Section 2.1, with actions Asi
and utilities usi (as) ∀i. Movement between stage games is
controlled by a state transition function T : S×A→ S. The
total rewards a player earns is the sum of rewards from all
future stage games, discounted by γ. States are partially ob-
servable because noise in the player’s observations of a−i
induces a distribution over T .
LFFP is an online lookahead search algorithm (similar
to [19]) that uses the likelihood’s of other agents’ actions
to track the current game being played, and searches into
the future for a limited horizon. In order to return con-
sistent actions we assume that an agent knows the set of
actions it individually can take in a given state, but must in-
fer the actions for the other agents from its beliefs about the
current state. LFFP uses FFP’s belief revision to update be-
liefs and, therefore, also to track the state — we later show
that using standard GWFP to do this results in very poor
performance because it does not accurately track the state.
Specifically, each agent computes an action to play in state
s, given its beliefs over others’ actions σs. This is done by
evaluating a recursive expression, which uses the knowl-
edge of the transition function and the observations re-
ceived so far, along with the agent’s current possible action
set to construct a probability of a particular stage game be-
ing played in the furture. Now, in order to explore and learn
the payoff structure of the problem, the agent randomises
between an optimal evaluation given its belief and an op-
timistic evaluation, where it assumes that the other agents
act to maximise its reward in the next time step.6 The op-
timal action evaluation in state s′ at d steps into the future,
V ∗(d,s′), is used with probability 1− ξ, and is given by:
V ∗(d,s′) =max
ai∈Ai
∑
a−i∈A−i
(
∏
j∈−i
σs
′
j (a j)
)(
rs
′
i (ai,a−i)
+ γ ∑
s′′∈S
T (s′′,ai,a−i,s′)V (d− 1,s′′)
)
where V (d − 1,∗) are the values, optimal or optimistic,
computed at each of the nodes at level d− 1 above (d,s′).
The optimistic value of an action, V opt(d,s), is used with
probability ξ, and is given by:
V opt(d,s) =max
ai∈Ai
max
a−i∈A−i
(
rsi (ai,a−i)
+ γ ∑
s′∈S
T (s′,ai,a−i,s)V (d− 1,s′)
)
These values are propagated down the search tree, begin-
ning at the leaves D steps into the future, with the agent
6The NashQ algorithm [10] uses a similar bias towards coor-
dinated equilibria, which are those NE that maximise all agents’
rewards. Now, because Dec-POMDPs are team games, there ex-
ists a coordinated equilibrium, and we bias exploration towards it
at each evaluation node in the search tree by making the described
optimistic evaluation.
choosing to use the optimal or optimistic evaluation at each
decision node. Finally, at the root node, the ai ∈ Ai that
maximises V ∗(0,s) is chosen (i.e no randomisation is used
at the root node). The ξ is annealed over time, following
∝ 1/t(1/2), where t is the iteration of the algorithm, so that in
the limit only V ∗(d,s′) are evaluated.
5.2 Numerical Evaluation of LFFP
In this section, we evaluate the performance of LFFP for
POSGs in the canonical cooperative box pushing problem
[17]. This problem consists of a gridworld containing two
agents, two small boxes and a large box. The agents can
independently push the small boxes into the goal to get a
small reward, but the highest reward is if both agents to-
gether push the large box into the goal, which neither can
do on its own. The agents are penalised for taking too
long or bumping into each other or the walls of the world.
Agents can move forward a step, turn left or right or stay
still. Finally, they can only see the state of the other agent
if it is nearby. The game consists of 100 states, 4 actions
and 5 observations, making it a challenging problem.
Specifically, agents are not supplied with the stage game
that they are playing, and further to this, the only positive
reward in the game is for pushing the boxes into the goal
area. Consequently, any solution needs to accurately es-
timate which stage game is being played and also plan a
path to the goal state. There are few algorithms which are
capable of finding a NE in such problems with uncertainty
that are also capable of scaling to more than two agents —
for example, most centralised offline Dec–POMDP mod-
els suffer from severe complexity bottlenecks. In con-
trast, LFFP does scale, since it effectively regards the other
agents as a single entity and learns a best response to their
joint action, and furthermore, avoids estimating the joint
history such as PBPG [21].
In this experiment, we compare LFFP to online local
search using the standard GWFP update rule (which we call
LGWFP), and the current state of the art in approximate
offline Dec–POMDP planners, PBPG. LFFP and LGWFP
are online learners whilst the benchmark is an offline plan-
ner, so we compare the reward accumulated for our learned
policy after 100000 timesteps to the planned policy from
PBPG over the same horizon (100 timesteps). PBGP al-
lows the specification of the number of points so we use
100 as per the published algorithm. As a further note, the
run–time for the offline planning is comparable to the learn-
ing time we allow LFFP and LGWFP.
As Fig 2 shows, LGWFP performs more poorly in this
game than GWFP did in the UAV monitoring game earlier.
Specifically, it stops converging even sooner than in Fig 1
(ε ≥ 0.15). This is because the error in estimating other
agents’ mixed strategies is compounded through the search
resulting in both poor stage game estimation and conver-
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Figure 2: Rewards in the cooperative box pushing problem.
gence. In contrast, LFFP does nearly as well as the nor-
mal game formalism. In more detail, it only stops converg-
ing for ε ≥ 0.35, which is a very high level of noise. The
slight reduction in performance is because again the error
in random observations starts to be compounded by chain-
ing multiple observations together. However, that said,
these results show that LFFP is a useful multi-agent learn-
ing strategy in stochastic games. The benchmark PBGP
only performs as well as our algorithm for a very small
amount of noise, and after this it even fails to find the non-
cooperative solution (each agent pushes a small box). One
possible reason for this is because more noise requires more
points to sample, whilst we kept this parameter fixed at the
value used by the authors themselves — and increasing this
value causes the runtime to increase dramatically. This is to
be contrasted with LFFP, which when it cannot find a good
model of the other agents, defaults to a safe individual pol-
icy, which may be lost in point based approaches.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we demonstrated that iterative learning,
which is computationally cheap, can be applied to static
optimisation and sequential decision–making with pertur-
bations to action observations. Specifically, we introduced
filtered fictitious play, which can learn NE in potential
games when action observations are perturbed by noise.
As such, it is suitable for distributed optimisation prob-
lems with noisy observations of actions or communication
channels. We proved that standard fictitious play processes
do not, in general, converge under perturbed action obser-
vations, and demonstrated FFPs benefits over GWFP in a
noisy coordination game. We then used FFP to derive a
solver, LFFP, for Dec–POMDPs in which state transitions
are a function of agents’ actions, and uncertainty arises as a
result of noise in action observations. We showed the util-
ity of LFFP in a partially observable stochastic game — the
cooperative box pushing problem. Here LFFP showed sig-
nificantly resistant to noise in observations and consistently
outperformed the state of the art in this setting.
Now that we have proven the convergence of FFP and
demonstrated the efficiacy of LFFP for POSGs and Dec–
POMDPs, future work will thoroughly analyse the conver-
gence and complexity of LFFP. With this established we
will investigate if the assumptions under which LFFP oper-
ates can be relaxed to allow it to learn the structure of the
underlying POSG (i.e. rewards and transitions) as well as
the policies of the other agents.
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